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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A review of Respondent's Reply Brief reveals the same primary arguments Laura made
in the written Final Argument she submitted following the three day trial in this matter
(R. p. 337-354). In addition, Laura does not provide this Court any material case law which is
different from that which was cited and discussed by Russell in his Initial Brief. Certainly this
appeal hinges on whether the magistrate abused its discretion in I) awarding Laura primary
physical custody with minimal visitation to Russell, and 2) allowing Laura to move to Utah \vilh
the parties' five minor children. This focus has not changed at all with the submission of
Respondent's Reply Brief.
There two primary areas of Laura's Reply Brief which Russell replies to herein.
Otherwise, the response to each of her reply arguments are largely contained in Russell's Initial
Brief and will not be repeated herein.

IV. ARGUMENT

A. THE MAGISTRATE'S CUSTODY DECISION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
JOINT LEGAL AND PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' MINOR
CHILDREN AND SPECIFICALLY DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR "FREQUENT
AND CONTINUING" CONTACT BETWEEN RUSSELL AND THE CHILDREN

Russell's emphasis on the fact that joint physical custody must include frequent and
continuing contact is not at all misplaced. In support of this assertion, Laura makes frequent
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mention of the Magistrate's declaration that his decision constitutes joint legal and physical
custody of the parties' minor children. Laura correctly states that an award of joint physical
custody "must assure that the child has 'frequent and continuing contact with both parents. '"
(Reply Brief, p. 9, quoting Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 197 P.3d 310,317 (2008».
However, because both the Magistrate and Laura repeatedly characterize the custody awarded to
Russell as "frequent" and "continuing," the appropriate question is whether custody awarded to
Russell satisfies criteria for "frequent" and/or "continuing" contact as a matter of law.

1. The Magistrate's Decision Does Not Provide Russell

With Frequent Contact with the Children

The Magistrate's decision provides for physical contact between Russell and the parties'
minor children 2 days out of every 14, or approximately 4 days in a given month (fourteen
percent (14%) of total time). Three of the parties' minor children were under the age of six (6)
when the Magistrate issued his custody decision. Although the Magistrate postulated that
communication between Russell and his children could be accomplished more frequently via
telephone and internet communication, he failed to appreciate that three of the pmiies' minor
children were still in their early years, when common knowledge holds that there is no viable
substitute for physical contact between a child and his/her parent. For a Magistrate to hold that
every-other-weekend contact between a parent and his/her child constitutes "frequent contact" is
to set the bar impossibly low and to render the tenD meaningless.
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2. The Magistrate's Decision Does Not Provide Russell With
Continuing Contact with the Children

The record is clear that prior to the parties' divorce, the Peterson children lived with both
parents and that both parents were actively involved in their care (See e.g., R. p. 256). The
Magistrate's decision to allow Laura to move out of state with the minor children would
forestall the continuing physical contact with Russell to which the children had become
accustomed prior to their parents' divorce and throughout the entirety of their lives. Even if
telephone and internet communication could mitigate some of the distance created by relocation,
Laura's move would prevent Russell from attending the children's school, church, and civic
functions and from participating meaningfully in their lives as he had consistently done prior to
the parties divorce-that is, on a "continuing" basis.
The Magistrate nonetheless held that every-other-weekend contact between a parent and
his/her child constituted "continuing contact." In so doing, he also ignored the impact of the four
and one half hours the Peterson children would be required to travel before they could enjoy any
physical contact with their father. The finding of the Magistrate thus renders the term
"continuing contact" meaningless in terms of what the law would otherwise require. Thus,
Russell's emphasis in his Initial Brief on the failure of the Magistrate to award joint physical
custody with frequent and continuing contact is not misplaced.
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B. THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION TO ALLOW RELOCATION BASED ON

THE EMOTIONAL NEEDS OF LAURA IS IMPROPER

The record illustrates that Laura took great care to highlight the needs she would have for
emotional support from her extended family after the divorce. This support, Laura asserted, was
only available in Utah where her extended family lives. The fact is, however, that Laura
otherwise requires such significant emotional support because her relocation prevents
meaningful involvement by Russell in the lives of the children. Thus, the full weight of the
responsibility in raising five children falls upon Laura. Laura's argument and the Magistrate's
decision both fail to acknowledge that Laura's relocation with the children and the resultant
disproportionate custody in her favor is what manufactures her emotional needs in the first place.
The record, supported most notably by testimony of both parties and Dr. Ruby Walker,
overwhelmingly establishes that 1) that Russell wants to continue his involvement in the lives of
his children on a daily basis; 2) that the children want to spend time with both parents: and 3)
that the parents have "set a precedent in one or the other caring for the children" (R. p. 257).
Laura's relocation with the children to Utah undem1ines all three of these facts. This
undoubtedly contributes to Laura's emotional burden as envisioned by the Magistrate should
Laura move the children to Utah.
The record clearly documents Laura's extended pattem of separating or attempting to
separate the children from their father:
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a.

Russell testified that he filed for divorce to place his children under the protection
of a JTRO when Laura told him she was moving out of state with the children the

following day.
b.

Five months later, Laura moved with the children away from the family residence
until the Magistrate required her return.

c.

Seventeen months after the divorce had been filed (and after a six-month period
of reconciliation), Laura filed a Civil Protection Order against Russell to effect his
removal from the residence. The children were thus prevented from all contact
with their father until the CPO was heard and subsequently dismissed by the
Magistrate.

In each of these instances, Russell continued in his role as an active father to their
children in spite of Laura's acts to prevent him from doing the same. His role as an active father
has mitigated the stress on Laura to solely bear the parenting responsibility. The emotional
support Laura would need after a move with the children to Utah would come, in large part, as a
direct result of that move, at least as far as caring for the children is concerned. Otherwise, her
need for emotional support from family members as Laura moves on and copes with postdivorce personal issues are not relevant to a consideration on the relocation question and should
not have been considered by the Magistrate.
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V. CONCLUSION

On the basis of the arguments, both legal and factual, set forth in Russell's Initial Brief
and this Response to Respondent's Reply Brief, Russell respectfully requests that this Court
1) find that the Magistrate abused its discretion in permitting Laura to move to Utah with the

children and reverse the Magistrate's decision and order that the children remain in Rigby,
Idaho; and 2) find that the magistrate abused its discretion in granting primary physical custody
to Laura with minimal visitation to Russell and reverse the Magistrate's decision and order that
the parties have joint physical custody of the children pursuant to the parenting plan
recommended by Dr. Ruby Walker.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of March, 2012.

TREVOR L. CASTLETON, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day I served a copy of the foregoing document upon
the designated parties affected thereby as follows:

x

Amelia A. Sheets, Esq.
Dunn Law Office, PLLC
477 Pleasant Country Lane
P. O. Box 277
Rigby, Idaho 83442

o
o
o

U.S. MAIL
FAX
HAND DELIVERY
COURTHOUSE BOX
EXPRESS DELIVERY

DATED this 19th day of March, 2012.

TREVOR L. CASTLETON, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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